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Thirty years ago one of us proposed a theory of perception exem-
plified by the phenomenon of visual masking, based on neural
mechanisms known to be responsible for contents and state of
consciousness (Bachmann, 1984). Some of the colleagues labeled
it “exotic,” perhaps trying to be polite by avoiding certain other
adjectives. Be that as it may, within only a few years conscious-
ness as a serious topic in mind sciences became firmly established
(e.g., Baars, 1988; Crick and Koch, 1990). However, it can be
argued that since then we have not learned much about the
neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). Although many influ-
ential high-profile studies on consciousness have been published
over the last 25 years, it is not clear how much of this research
is directly relevant for understanding the neural basis of con-
scious experience (Aru et al., 2012a; de Graaf et al., 2012; Miller,
2015). The key reason for this pessimistic view is the following:
many studies using various experimental paradigms have relied
on the contrast between trials with and without conscious per-
ception, but this contrast is not selective for revealing the NCC
(Miller, 2007; Aru et al., 2012a; de Graaf et al., 2012). Rather,
such contrast can always also lead to processes that in reality pre-
cede or follow conscious experience. As the majority of studies
have been conducted with some variations of such contrastive
analysis, it is hard to estimate how many of these studies are
directly informative about NCC. Hence, although there are the-
ories of consciousness that have made it to standard neuroscience
textbooks, the puzzle of consciousness persists and the need for
focused interdisciplinary attacks on the problem is as timely
as ever.
One might think that we are overselling the problem, but
contributions to the current research topic support our cau-
tious standpoint. In particular, Pitts et al. (2014a) show that
the P300, often declared to be the neural correlate of conscious
access, is not observed when the subjects consciously perceive
the target but it is task-irrelevant, i.e., when the subjects do
not have to report the target (see also Pitts et al., 2014b). Also,
Vidal et al. (2014) use an experimental paradigm of percep-
tual suppression through decreased contrast to demonstrate that
local gamma band responses in several brain areas can increase
while conscious perception is suppressed. Hence, increases in
local gamma band responses do not reflect the NCC (see also
Aru et al., 2012b). Finally, Ruhnau et al. (2014) review recent
work illustrating that prerequisites of consciousness are not nec-
essarily only local neural processes but rather depend on fluc-
tuations of large-scale networks. Hence long-range integration
across brain areas cannot be a specific marker of NCC. Although
there will be definitely debates about these particular studies
and results, the bottom line here is that the status of certain
neural processes once thought to reflect the correlates of con-
sciousness (such as the P300, local gamma band responses and
long-range integration) has to be carefully reconsidered. (We
kindly remind the readers that discussions about these studies
can be carried out in the comments section of the respective
articles.)
In addition to these studies showing that old results and
theories have to be re-evaluated (Pitts et al., 2014a; Ruhnau
et al., 2014; Vidal et al., 2014), the present research topic
provided the following potential guidelines for consciousness
research:
(1) There are many different aspects of consciousness that
should not be confounded with each other. In addi-
tion to the classic distinction between phenomenal, access
and reflective consciousness (Block, 1995); Navajas et al.
(2014) describe the need to distinguish between per-
ceptual and contextual awareness. Among other things,
future research should study possible differences in the
qualitative experiences between these two varieties of
consciousness.
(2) Safavi et al. (2014) point out that for understanding a com-
plex phenomenon like conscious experience it is necessary to
consider data provided by various experimental techniques to
assess brain activity on different spatial and temporal scales.
The contributions to the present research topic adhere to
this variety, as results from intracranial measurements (Vidal
et al., 2014), fMRI (Wang andHe, 2014), and EEG (Pitts et al.,
2014a) are considered in the original research contributions
to the research topic.
(3) It is furthermore clear that one does not only want to mea-
sure consciousness and the associated processes, but also
manipulate them. Tapia and Beck (2014) and de Graaf and
Sack (2014) provide an update of how studies with TMS
are contributing to the science of consciousness (see also
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Bachmann and Francis, 2013, for this purpose). Tapia and
Beck (2014) describe the ways how combining and com-
paring traditional visual modal masking and TMS-masking
can inform us about the putative mechanisms of visual
consciousness, roles of feedforward and feedback processes,
and also the possible meaning of alpha-frequency activity
in mediating awareness. In addition to reviewing the per-
tinent TMS-masking research and commenting on other
non-invasive brain stimulation methods for studying NCC,
de Graaf and Sack (2014) describe another important use
of TMS—creating artificially evoked phenomenology such as
phosphenes. The contributions of this Research Topic are not
alone in the recent works emphasizing the usefulness of stim-
ulation methods for locating the NCC (Parvizi et al., 2012;
Koubeissi et al., 2014).
(4) From the data analysis perspective it is essential that the
science of consciousness incorporates the advances in mul-
tivariate decoding of neural activity patterns (Haynes, 2009).
Sandberg et al. (2014) review the basics of pattern analysis
techniques and discuss their main contributions to studying
the NCC.
(5) We often seem to forget a very basic attribute of
consciousness—its panmodality. We are conscious of sounds,
lights, smells, etc. Thus, in order to get closer to NCC it
is useful to investigate the neural correlates of intermodal
and cross-modal processes of conscious experience. Wang
and He (2014) extracted brain activity present during ongo-
ing conscious flow of story experience regardless of input
modality and describe the network underlying this modality-
independent processing.
(6) Furthermore, it is necessary that researchers studying the
state of consciousness and contents of consciousness unite
their forces to provide a complete account about how con-
sciousness emerges from the neural processes (Hohwy, 2009;
Bachmann and Hudetz, 2014). More specifically, it also may
require cellular and sub-cellular level research and mechanis-
tic level analysis in order to integrate state- and content-based
approaches (Bachmann and Hudetz, 2014).
(7) Finally, one has to stay optimistic, but at the same time
also realistic. Miller (2014, 2015) argues that ultimately one
does not want to find only the NCC but rather the neural
constituents of consciousness. He makes it evident that we
currently do not even have the strategy for approaching the
neural constituents of consciousness. Let us then remark here
that we currently have trouble even with the NCC.
It might be that for understanding the NCC we need more
advanced tools for measuring and controlling neural processes.
However, it is important to note that such sophisticated tools will
not be sufficient for closing in on the mechanisms of conscious-
ness due to the problem mentioned above: contrasting trials with
and without conscious perception cannot reveal the NCC. Thus,
given the accelerating pace of technical improvements it is nec-
essary that the cognitive neuroscience community steps up the
game too and asks: how can our experimental paradigms specifi-
cally target the neural basis of consciousness? The present research
topic did not provide definite answers, but several promising
directions of research have been envisaged and potential pitfalls
pointed at.
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